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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the theoretical perspective of the UN High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change on reform of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). This is done by studying two contrasting theories and 
applying them to the case of UNSC reform. Both perspectives presume the 
universal norm of democracy. The common ground is noticed in the similarities 
between the reform proposals of the two theories. However their different 
emphasis on the dual subject status of democracy (communitarianism: states and 
cosmopolitanism: individuals) makes it possible to tell their reform proposals 
apart. The communitarian approach suggests the enlargement of the UNSC by 
small and diverse states. The cosmopolitan theory conversely supports an 
expansion by the demographically largest states. The result of this paper deduces 
that the UNSC reform proposals of the report by the UN High-Level Panel appear 
to lean somewhat more towards the cosmopolitan theory. 
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1 Introduction 
The United Nations Security Council is the organ that is to act on behalf of all UN 
member states and whose decisions are binding for the members (UN Charter 
Articles 24.1 and 25 – See Appendix 1). I developed an interest for the question of 
the legitimacy of the UN Security Council when I interned at the UN 
Headquarters in New York last summer. In the UNHQ I attended a Security 
Council session and an informal meeting concerning how the Security Council 
can remain a legitimate international actor. The issue is once again under inquiry 
in the UN Secretariat: a report by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenge 
and Change, which partly deals with reform proposals of the Security Council, 
was submitted in December 2004. The findings of the report on Security Council 
reform are studied in this paper. The topic is also deliberated in the member states, 
e.g., the prime minister of Sweden highlighted the need for a reform in his 
statement in the general debate of the 59th regular session of the UN General 
Assembly in September 2004. Naturally academics in the field of international 
politics discuss the matter of modification of the Security Council as well. 
 
This paper analyzes the lines of thought within the theories of communitarianism 
and cosmopolitanism. The theoretical perspective of Security Council reform 
proposals is significant. Although the theory is present, implicitly or explicitly, 
when discussing reform proposals of the Security Council, it is not elucidated in 
the debate. Therefore it can be interesting to try to figure out the underlying 
theoretical standpoint of the UN High-Level Panel’s findings. 
 
The reform debate touches upon the paradox of the UN claiming to be 
representative of its member states (and advocating values such as democracy and 
equal rights for all) while its main organ, the Security Council, is criticized for 
being illegitimate, undemocratic and not indicating the geographical 
representation of the membership. 
 
If the Security Council would be created all over again it would probably not have 
the same composition as today. The only criterion that might be applicable to all 
of the five permanent members is the military dominance. The principle of 
economic power and electoral, territorial and geographical representation would 
not be valid for France and the United Kingdom. Furthermore the right of veto 
would probably not exist (Falk in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:310; Weiss 
2003:151).  
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1.1 History 
When the UN was founded the Security Council consisted of eleven member 
states, five permanent (P-5) and six rotating members elected by the General 
Assembly for a term of two years on the basis of “equitable geographical 
distribution”. In 1965 the first and only substantial reform of the Security Council 
was carried out: four non-permanent members were added to the Security 
Council. (Weiss 2003:147; Bourantonis & Magliveras 2002:26) From the start of 
the organization the great powers after the Second World War (the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China) received permanent 
seats and the power of veto in the Security Council. The veto might have been a 
precondition for the great powers to go in for the UN. States that disagreed with 
the special treatment of the P-5 mistakenly presumed that there would be a 
conference to review the shape of the Security Council soon after its 
implementation. This did not happen because of resistance from the P-5. (Weiss 
2003:148) The member states of the UN were 51 in 1945 and have increased 
radically over the years, e.g., of countries from Africa and Asia after the process 
of decolonization. Today the membership is nearly universal with 191 member 
states. Despite many proposals and efforts to reform (e.g. in the 1990s with open-
ended informal working groups of the General Assembly), still no amendment 
resolution of the composition of the Security Council has been approved since 
1965. (Weiss 2003:149; Baylis & Smith 2001:332) 
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1.2 Theory and Questions 
This paper is a deductive study concentrating on two different theories within “the 
English school” of international politics. (Landman 2003:15) The reform 
proposals of the Security Council by the UN High-Level Panel will be examined 
after criteria for evaluation have been established. The criteria will be based on 
what the theories of communitarianism and cosmopolitanism state in the matter. 
 
The chosen perspective within the communitarian theory is represented by 
Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor. David Held and Daniele Archibugi are two 
known advocates of the cosmopolitan theory. Having selected a certain line of 
thought within each theory I am aware that there might be other proponents of the 
same theories not agreeing with the necessity of reform, or with the reform 
proposals here presented by the different theories. The chosen representatives deal 
with normative and philosophical theory within political science. For this reason 
the theoretical perspectives can be applied on the case of reformation of the 
Security Council, i.e. the question of democracy at the global level. Possible 
Security Council reform proposals of these two groups of proponents will be 
constructed in the first part of the paper and applied in the second part (on the 
report of the UN High-Level Panel). The dividing line between the two theories 
will start off from their different focus concerning subjects of democracy. 
 
When discussing reform of the Security Council three main concepts will be 
mentioned: representation, democracy and legitimacy. In the context of the UN 
legitimate means “consistent with the UN Charter”. Democracy at the global level 
might differ from national democratic politics. The theories call attention to 
different parts of the UN Charter. Communitarianism emphasizes the equality 
among all states as the basis for democracy at the international political arena 
while cosmopolitanism favours majority rule and equality of the citizens. 
Representation can be divided in geographical (e.g. continent), territorial (e.g. 
area of a state) and electoral (e.g. population of a state). Both theories would 
stress the importance of equal geographical distribution (UN Charter 23.1). 
Communitarianism might highlight it even more though and would support 
territorial before electoral representation contrary to cosmopolitanism. 
 
The analytical problem in the first section of the paper (chapters 2, 3 and 4) can be 
seen as a “pre-study”: 
* What are the proposals of communitarianism and cosmopolitanism on how to 
reform the UN Security Council to become legitimate, democratic and 
representative? 
 
The main question of the paper is: 
* Which is the theoretical perspective of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenge and Change on Security Council reform? 
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1.3 Method and Material 
The paper is divided into two main parts. The first section of the paper will 
present the contrasting theories. It will elaborate on the theories’ potential view on 
how to reform the Security Council in order for it to be legitimate, democratic and 
representative. The second part will examine the reform proposals of the UN 
High-Level Panel’s report on the issue and apply the theories dealt with in the first 
part on the ideas of the report. (Esaiasson et.al. 2003:40, 97) The method is 
qualitative and the analysis integrated continually in all chapters of the paper. 
(Landman 2003:19) 
 
This paper will indirectly be an empirical study on how the Security Council is 
working today, a normative indication on how it should be functioning and a 
constructive perspective on how it can be changed to a more relevant organ in 
today’s world politics. (Landman 2003:15) 
 
The material has been strategically decided on with respect to quantity and 
quality. I have employed different sources to get second-opinions on facts drawn 
on in the paper. Empirical literature, e.g. information about the function and 
history of the UN Security Council, has been found in analytical articles and the 
course book of international politics by John Baylis and Steve Smith. For the 
process of the paper I have resorted to two textbooks in methodology. 
 
I have chosen two representatives from each strand of theory to make sure the 
arguments are well substantiated. The lines of thought of the theories have been 
found in the direct work of the proponents (Walzer, Taylor, Archibugi and Held). 
Articles have been searched in ELIN (database of articles) as well as located in 
anthologies. Possible reform proposals by the respective theory had to be 
“constructed” by analyzing the theory since the theoretical literature did not hold 
this information. 
 
The majority of the material used in the paper consists of secondary sources. The 
primary sources utilized are the UN Charter Chapter V (Appendix 1) and the 
report by the UN High-Level Panel. The publications have been downloaded from 
the UN website. Information about the High-Level Panel and its report has been 
gathered from press releases of the homepage of UN News and from the website 
about UN global security issues. 
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2 The theories: two subjects of 
democracy 
The two coming chapters will analyze the chosen lines of thought within the 
theories followed by potential Security Council reform proposals of each theory. 
Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer will represent the communitarian theory and 
Daniele Archibugi and David Held will stand for the cosmopolitan approach. 
 
The theories equally assume that democracy is a universal norm of governance. 
Governance at the international level affects two subjects: states and individuals. 
According to democratic theory they are both subjects of democracy with rights 
and duties under the UN Charter. This implies that two sets of interests have to be 
considered in decision-making. (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held 
& Köhler 1998:290-291) However the UN simply considers states as legal 
subjects; only recognized states can enter into the treaty (Baylis & Smith 
2001:332). 
 
The dual subject status is significant when comparing the two theories, 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, as they each stress different subjects of 
democracy. Cosmopolitan theory regards individuals as the subjects of democracy 
and therefore would apply the principle of “one person, one vote”. The 
communitarian approach conceives of states/communities as the main subjects, 
and consequently the rule of “one state, one vote” becomes central. Hence the 
debate between the two theories can be seen as one between electoral and 
territorial representation. (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & 
Köhler 1998:291) The Security Council can be seen as undemocratic both 
regarding electoral and territorial representation. The chosen perspectives of the 
communitarian and cosmopolitan theory find reform proposals of the Security 
Council necessary. 
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3 The communitarian theory 
The representatives of communitarianism, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer, 
focus on the right of states or communities. Walzer’s and Taylor’s line of thought 
asserts that democracy is universally valid, contrary to some advocates within 
communitarianism who find universal rights impossible to achieve (Bienen, 
Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:300-301; Frohnen 
1996:151-152). Some communitarians might accept the right to member seats of 
undemocratic states in the Security Council (since no foreign state can declare its 
values upon another state). They do not believe in international democracy and 
point to the fact that democracy is easier the smaller and more homogenous the 
society (Archibugi in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:206-207; Walzer 
1980:226). Even if Walzer supports the democratic system he holds a perspective 
closer to relativism than universalism (and therefore collective rights before 
individual rights) in some of his works. According to Walzer rights can only be 
universal temporarily and minimalism is almost always a part of maximalism. He 
argues that values cannot be separated from their historical, cultural, religious and 
political contexts and acknowledges individual’s identification with their 
communities and political institutions. (Walzer 1994; Bellamy & Castiglione in 
Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:163-164) 
 
Communitarianism sees individuals as highly attached to their societies. 
Individuals are born into several kinds of groups and social unions in a state. 
(Taylor in Rosenblum 1989:164; Frohnen 1996:158; Walzer 1990:15) People’s 
identity is formed in the community, which also is important for 
patriotism/nationalism and how we perceive each other internationally. (Taylor 
1993:52, 173; Taylor in Rosenblum 1989:166, 170) Communitarians accept states 
as legal subjects of democracy because the community is represented by the state 
in the UN. (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:301) 
In the state the communities can realize their role. Communitarianism regards the 
rights of states as derived from the rights of communities. Consequently it does 
not give states unique features in the way that, e.g., the theory of realism does. 
(Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:302; Walzer 
1980:210, 227) The communitarian approach wants to protect and preserve 
particular communities and states. (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, 
Held & Köhler 1998:302) At the global level the collective bondedness between 
states, that communitarians rate highly, might be lost. That is why there need to be 
a set of international laws to achieve wide consensus and protect states in 
minority. (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:294; 
Walzer 1980:226; Taylor 1993:176) 
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3.1 Security Council reform proposals of the 
communitarian theory 
The communitarian approach emphasizes the rights of all states (i.e. the principle 
of “one state, one vote”). Article 2 of the UN Charter - the sovereign equity of all 
member states - is underlined. Member states should be equal states irrespective 
of their population, land size, economic or military power (Taylor 1993:177-178; 
Weiss 2003:149; Archibugi in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:207; Bienen, 
Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:294). The communitarian 
theory might promote the entry of smaller states (demographically or territorially) 
into the Security Council and could advise that states with different point of views 
and from different parts of the world will be represented in the Security Council, 
e.g., “minor” developing countries. 
 
Communitarianism values the preservation of diverse states and communities 
(Archibugi in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:221; Archibugi in Archibugi and 
Held 1995:154; Held 1995:279). For this reason better regional representation 
from Africa, Middle East, and South Asia would be welcomed. Since the 
communitarian theory favour communities the addition of regional organizations 
such as the European Union, the African Union, the Organization of American 
States and the Arab League to the Security Council might be a proposal to 
improve the political regional representation. This change would however involve 
a considerable change of the Charter, which for the moment only admits states 
and not international organizations in the UN (Bourantonis & Magliveras 
2002:28). 
 
According to communitarianism the power of veto in the Security Council 
deviates from the equality between states and must be abolished in order for the 
Security Council to receive democratic legitimacy. The veto leads to an oligarchic 
structure among member states. Reform proposals suggesting that the power of 
veto is extended to more or new states would only change the order in the 
oligarchy and contradict democratic reform of the Security Council. The same 
result applies to an expansion of permanent members in the Security Council. 
(See Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:295) 
 
Strengthening other bodies vis-à-vis the Security Council such as the General 
Assembly and the International Court of Justice is another reform alternative. The 
goal of the communitarian approach would be to make the Security Council 
accountable by creating an institutionalized control system. A way to do this is to 
revitalize the General Assembly. In the General Assembly the communitarian 
principle is present in the sense that each state has one vote no matter of its size: 
equal territorial representation (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held 
& Köhler 1998:303). As it is now stated in the Charter each body “interprets its 
own competence” meaning that, e.g., the International Court of Justice does not 
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have the right to officially check the work of the Security Council (Bienen, 
Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:296). 
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4 The cosmopolitan theory 
The cosmopolitan perspective that will be presented by David Held and Daniele 
Archibugi, argues that individuals are the primary subjects of democracy at the 
international level. The word “cosmopolitan”, here resembling “transnational”, 
captures the twofold significance of citizenship both to a state and to the world 
(Archibugi in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:216). The aspiration of the 
cosmopolitan democracy model is that world citizens would get ahead of states as 
subjects of international law. (Ibid:223) The basis for democracy at the 
international political arena will be majority rule and equality of the citizens (rule 
of law). (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:292) 
 
Cosmopolitans argue that democratic governance at the international level is 
developing but still is imperfect because of its traditional connection to the state 
(Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:293). However 
the state is not the only holder of democracy anymore. Cosmopolitans imply that 
the state sovereignty/the logic of Westphalia is diminishing. (Ibid:288; Held 
1995:83) 
 
The communitarian thinking of Walzer and Taylor can be related to cosmopolitan 
theory in that it takes individuals as the underlying point of departure. The right of 
states are derived from individuals’ rights. Cosmopolitans, who support a 
“thin”/universal form of morality, bestow individuals’ allegiances with their 
communities less significance than communitarianism. Cosmopolitanism argues 
that social relationships are voluntary while the communitarian theory finds them 
to be predefined (Walzer 1990: 21; Walzer 1980:228; Taylor 1993:178). 
 
Procedural liberal political theory has similar characteristics to cosmopolitanism 
and observes individuals separated from the community. According to liberalism 
the only thing that connects people, who are strangers to each other, is self-
interest and necessity (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 
1998:300; Walzer 1990:8; Taylor 1993:109; Taylor in Rosenblum 1989:165, 
172). 
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4.1 Security Council reform proposals of the 
cosmopolitan theory 
The reform proposals of the Security Council by the cosmopolitan approach will 
not, in spite of what is stated earlier, be to switch states with individuals. This is 
not realistic in the UN of today. The proposals of cosmopolitanism rather wish to 
emphasize the preamble of the UN Charter stating “the peoples of the UN”. The 
cosmopolitan approach suggests that the UN should be accountable to the states’ 
populations (next to their governments). The individuals should be given a voice 
in the international organization according to cosmopolitan democracy (See 
Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:291, 297). 
 
The cosmopolitan perspective represents a participatory democracy (more than, 
e.g., liberal representative democracy). (Held 1995:285; Archibugi in Archibugi, 
Held & Köhler 1998:221) Cosmopolitanism would suggest a consultative vote in 
the Security Council to representatives from civil society. Another proposition to 
reform the Security Council might be to create a second parliamentary assembly 
(model European Parliament) composed of national representatives from different 
areas of the society. The number of members from each state would be in 
proportion to the inhabitants (with protection of the smallest states) and the actors 
would be held answerable to their electorates. Hereby increased representation 
would be given to the people (See Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, 
Held & Köhler 1998:297; Held 1995:273-274). 
 
A problem with the cosmopolitan plan is that it assumes that all member states are 
democratic. Democratization of the international organization and its organs 
implies democratization of individual states in the cosmopolitan model (Bienen, 
Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:304). The suggestion is 
therefore dependent of some type of legal coercive power and procedure for 
security reasons. (See Held 1995:276, 279) 
 
The cosmopolitan model of democracy would recommend the limitation (and 
ultimately abolition) of the veto, as this power is undemocratic. (See Archibugi in 
Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:221) Permanent members might be seen as 
against democratic principles just like the power of veto. Cosmopolitanism would 
probably accept an expansion of the Security Council with rotating members (like 
communitarianism). The General Assembly elects non-permanent members and 
therefore it should be possible to evaluate how they have performed in the 
Security Council. 
 
The vote of each state should be in line with the population size according to the 
principle of “one individual, one vote” (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in 
Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:298). The cosmopolitan view would suggest that 
the demographically largest states in the world should be represented in the 
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Security Council, such as Brazil and India. The electoral principle in its strict 
sense would exclude smaller states from the seats of the Security Council. 
Therefore cosmopolitan theory does not interpret the principle strictly; it employs 
safeguards for the populations of small states (Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in 
Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998:303). Cosmopolitanism would still give the 
developing countries, whose populations and military power have increased 
enormously, a significant executive influence in the Security Council (See 
Archibugi in Archibugi and Held 1995:151; Held 1995:279). 
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5 The report of the UN High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change 
On the 2nd of December 2004 a panel of sixteen eminent persons (former heads 
of State, foreign ministers, security, military, diplomatic and development 
officials - See Appendix 2) submitted the report “A more secure world: Our 
shared responsibility”. The report contains 101 recommendations to reform the 
United Nations. Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan established the Commission 
in November 2003 and instructed it to, among other things, review the principal 
organs of the UN (See Appendix 3). The Secretary-General will present his own 
suggestions on the basis of the 95-page report in March 2005. (UN-globalsecurity 
2004; UN News December 2004) 
 
Part four Section fourteen of the report discusses the reform of the Security 
Council. According to the Commission the Security Council needs to become 
credible, legitimate (i.e. in conformity with the Charter) and more representative 
of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities. 
(Report 2004: 77) The criticism is hard and extensive but the concrete proposal on 
Security Council reform (in fact two alternatives) does not reflect all the 
dissatisfaction stated in the report. 
5.1 The theoretical perspective of the High-Level 
Panel on Security Council reform 
The Panel suggests that the Security Council should be expanded from fifteen to 
twenty-four members. It presents two alternative solutions in order for the 
Security Council to become more representative. (The members of the Panel 
might not have been able to agree.) 
 
The first result, model A, consists of six new permanent members without the 
power of veto and three member states on a two-year mandate (the same condition 
as for the E-10 today). For tables on the recommended distribution of the seats 
among the regional areas see Appendix 4. (Report 2004:81) Africa and Asia plus 
the Pacific, which only have one permanent seat today (China), would receive 
four additional permanent seats. Moreover the new non-permanent seats would 
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favour these regions opposite Europe and Americas.* This suggestion supports 
both the communitarian and cosmopolitan perspective in that it gives continents 
with a large amount of developing countries more representation and authority in 
the Security Council (although none of the theories would suggest permanent 
seats or support the conservation of the veto). Also many large states (and big 
contributors to the UN) are situated in these regional districts, which would reflect 
the cosmopolitan approach. Possible countries for the permanent seats in the 
proposal are Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa. It would be a 
more balanced Security Council between the regional areas of the world, which 
especially adheres to the communitarian theory that value equality among 
communities. 
 
The second proposal, model B, is more complicated than the first one and 
includes a new category of members. There would be eight semi-permanent 
members that will get longer mandate terms than two years but will not become 
completely permanent members; they would have four-year renewable-term seats. 
One extra non-permanent member for a period of two years would also be added 
in model B. (Report 2004:81) The new group of semi-permanent seats would be 
equally distributed among the four regional areas, two each. From a regional 
outlook, especially Europe remains privileged in this model. However regarding 
the additional non-permanent member, Africa and Asia receive an advantage, like 
in the first model. 
 
Thus the Commission’s suggestion is a larger Security Council with the P-5 
remaining at their permanent seats with the veto. Both the theoretical lines of 
thought would argue that the Panel should have submitted a more bold reform 
proposal, e.g., restricted the veto of the P-5. But the Panel thinks that the proposal 
is extensive; it would have been an unrealistic plan to propose an abolition of the 
power of veto. The tendency in the proposal is clear however since the Panel does 
not suggest giving the veto to more states. On the contrary it firmly states in its 
recommendations that there should be “no expansion of the veto”. The Panel 
criticizes the power of veto in the report by saying that it is anachronistic and does 
not belong to a democratic era. (Report 2004:82) 
 
The report frequently emphasizes the principle of honouring Article 23.1 of the 
UN Charter and states that voting power of the member states should be in 
accordance with their financial, military and diplomatic contributions to the UN. 
The member states that mainly contribute to the UN should be more involved in 
the decision-making and thus have the privilege of permanent or longer-term seats 
in the Security Council. Except for economic donation to the regular budget and 
assistance with armed troops to peacekeeping operations, development aid is seen 
as an important aspect of contributions to the UN. (Report 2004:77, 80, 82, 109) 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
* Today the regional distribution is five from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America 
and two from Western Europe and other states (UN Charter Article 23.1). 
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As demonstrated above, another opinion of the Panel is the necessity of wider 
representation in the Security Council from all the UN member states and in 
particular from developing countries. The two principles do not seem to 
harmonize. For that reason developed and developing countries cannot be 
measured by the same criteria. Selective preference must also be taken for a 
certain number of contributors in each regional area of the world. (See Report 
2004:80, 82, 110) The system of selectivity might and might not be supported by 
democratic theory. 
 
The recommendation of favouring the states with the biggest resources would be 
rejected by the communitarian theory. It could also be seen as a contradiction to 
equality of persons and not in line with cosmopolitan democratic reform. Yet it 
might be regarded as fair and necessary in order to get the most powerful states to 
involve in multilateral cooperation at all to give their rights priority before less 
powerful states. (See Bienen, Rittberger & Wagner in Archibugi, Held & Köhler 
1998:299; Archibugi in Archibugi and Held 1995:153; Report 2004:77, 80, 82) 
 
The report supports an enforcement of the General Assembly in relation to the 
Security Council, just like the communitarian approach. It states that the General 
Assembly has exceptional legitimacy but has lost strength (Report 2004:77). No 
direct changes of the General Assembly are proposed but the report states that its 
focus and structure should be improved by renewed efforts of all member states 
(Report 2004:78). The cosmopolitan proposition of creating an additional second 
assembly (with representatives directly elected by the people) might be in the 
same line of thinking as strengthening the General Assembly (even though the 
governments elect the state representatives in the General Assembly). 
 
Europe remains with two permanent seats; the replacement of France and the 
United Kingdom with the EU is not discussed. The report does not propose 
inclusion of international organizations into the Security Council but it suggests 
that the Security Council should make use of the benefits of cooperating with 
regional and subregional organizations (Report 2004:78). Thus in this matter the 
Panel does not “take the step” but nonetheless is leaning towards 
communitarianism. 
 
As for the suggestion of the cosmopolitan theory of a consultative vote from 
representatives of civil society in the Security Council, the Panel mentions that it 
supports further public engagement in the activities of the Security Council. 
(Report 2004:83) The same as for regional organizations applies to the relations 
with civil society and NGO’s. (Report 2004:79) The report actually advises the 
introduction of an arrangement of “indicative voting”. A member of the Security 
Council should be able to ask for an assessment of the positioning of the public on 
a specific issue or action. However the public indication would not have any 
legality. (Report 2004:82) 
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6 Conclusion 
The analysis presented in the first part of the paper, of possible reform proposals 
of the contrasting theories, reveals that the theories often have similar reform 
ideas. The theories have the same basic democratic values. Both lines of thought 
within the theories point to similarities between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism when it comes to politics (there are more differences 
concerning philosophical and psychological concerns). The cosmopolitan theory 
is not completely committed to a presocial self and communitarianism does not 
mean that socialization is the only truth. Individuals can be seen as the base in the 
community/state according to communitarianism and cosmopolitanism accepts 
that states currently are the only legal subjects in the UN. 
 
The single difference that can be clearly distinguished, regarding the Security 
Council reform proposals, is the focus of communitarianism on protection of 
smaller and diverse states and equality among all states in the Security Council, 
while cosmopolitanism consider majority rule and populous countries in its 
reform. The dissimilarity depends on the theories’ different centre of attention 
concerning the legal subjects of states/communities and individuals. 
 
Regarding the second part of the paper, the earlier stated similarities between the 
theories (and between their reform proposals) consequently makes it hard to draw 
an obvious line from the findings of the report to any of the theories. Furthermore 
the Panel does not go as far as any of the theories on recommending Security 
Council reform. The theories focus on democratic governance. The report 
additionally has to take into consideration the effectiveness of the Security 
Council and also realistic and practical ways to transform the composition of the 
Security Council. The Panel does not suggest limitation or abolition of the power 
of veto, but nor its extension. The report states that the veto is an anachronism 
from 1945. It nevertheless proposes an expansion of permanent members in model 
A, which is against democratic principles. 
 
The report’s elaborated enlargement of the Security Council in model A and B are 
the only concrete proposals on how to change the organ to become more 
representative (electorally and geographically). In both models preference seem to 
be given to the expansion of the Security Council with states from regions that 
hold heavily populated and powerful states. Thus the report is here pursuing 
cosmopolitan before communitarian standards. 
 
The suggestion of communitarianism to revitalize the General Assembly is similar 
to what is considered in the report. The Panel also supports better cooperation 
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between the Security Council and civil society and the possibility of checking the 
public opinion by “indicative voting”, which is desired by cosmopolitanism. 
 
The proposal of adding smaller states to the Security Council by the 
communitarian approach is not explicitly stated in the report. However the Panel 
does support a selectivity system for regional representation and for the entrance 
into the Security Council of less powerful states (not contributing as much 
financially, militarily and diplomatically), e.g., developing countries. The 
acceptance of membership of regional organizations in the Security Council, a 
suggestion by the communitarian approach, is not mentioned in the report. 
 
From what is stated above it can merely be deduced that the report’s 
recommendations lean slightly more towards cosmopolitanism than 
communitarianism, but it is not evident. The matter that concludes the observation 
is that the proposals in model A and B appear to give preference to large/populous 
and mighty states, which is more in agreement with the reform idea of the 
cosmopolitan theory. 
 
The result of the paper might not be useful for society in general but it is 
interesting to see whether and, if so, how the UN’s reform proposals can be 
positioned theoretically. The analysis has shown that characteristics from both 
theories can be applied. The question of generalization of the outcome of this 
paper could be a starting-point for further research (Esaiasson et.al. 2003:170). 
Perhaps the same tendency towards the cosmopolitan theoretical position can be 
found in more aspects of the reform work of the UN. Even if nothing far-reaching 
has been concluded, hopefully some attentiveness has been raised of what general 
underlying theoretical perspectives the UN might present in its reports. 
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Appendix 1 
 
United Nations Charter Chapter V 
COMPOSITION 
 
 
Article 23 
1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The 
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America 
shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall 
elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the 
Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the 
contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international 
peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to 
equitable geographical distribution.  
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of 
two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of 
the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four 
additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall 
not be eligible for immediate re-election.  
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.  
FUNCTIONS and POWERS 
 
 
Article 24 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.  
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the 
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, 
VIII, and XII.  
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the 
General Assembly for its consideration.  
 
  
Article 25 
 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. 
Article 26 
 
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security 
with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the 
Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff 
Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United 
Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.  
VOTING 
 
 
Article 27 
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.  
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of nine members.  
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a 
party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.  
PROCEDURE 
 
 
Article 28 
1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. 
Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all 
times at the seat of the Organization.  
2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, 
if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other 
specially designated representative.  
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the 
Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.  
  
Article 29 
 
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions. 
Article 30 
 
The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting 
its President. 
Article 31 
 
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may 
participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security 
Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially 
affected.  
Article 32 
 
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or 
any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under 
consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the 
discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions 
as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United 
Nations 
 
 
 
Source: www.un.org, 04/01/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2 
 
The members of the High-Level Panel 
 
 
• Anand Panyarachun (Chairman), former Prime Minister of Thailand 
• Robert Badinter (France), Member of the French Senate and former Minister of Justice of 
France; 
• Joao Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), former Secretary-General of the Organization of 
American States; 
• Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), former Prime Minister of Norway and former Director-
General of the World Health Organization; 
• Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana), Vice-Chairman, National Development Planning 
Commission of Ghana and former Deputy Director-General, International Labour 
Organization; 
• Gareth Evans (Australia), President of the International Crisis Group and former Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Australia; 
• David Hannay (United Kingdom), former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom 
to the United Nations and United Kingdom Special Envoy to Cyprus; 
• Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), President of the Inter-American Development Bank; 
• Amre Moussa (Egypt), Secretary-General of the League of Arab States; 
• Satish Nambiar (India), former Lt. General in the Indian Army and Force Commander of 
UNPROFOR; 
• Sadako Ogata (Japan), former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; 
• Yevgenii Primakov (Russia), former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation; 
• Qian Qichen (China), former Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China; 
• Nafis Sadik (Pakistan), former Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund; 
• Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), former Secretary-General of the 
Organization of African Unity; and 
• Brent Scowcroft (United States), former Lt. General in the United States Air Force and 
United States National Security Adviser. 
 
 
Source: UN-globalsecurity 2004, http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/panel.asp#1, 17/11/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 3 
 
Terms of Reference of High-Level Panel 
 
The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined 
confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and 
challenges.  It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the range 
and nature of the challenges we face, and are likely to face in the future. 
 
The aim of the High-level Panel is to recommend clear and practical measures for 
ensuring effective collective action, based upon a rigorous analysis of future threats to 
peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make, and a 
thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including 
the principal organs of the United Nations. 
 
The Panel is not being asked to formulate policies on specific issues, nor on the UN’s 
role in specific places.  Rather, it is being asked to provide a new assessment of the 
challenges ahead, and to recommend the changes which will be required if these 
challenges are to be met effectively through collective action. 
 
Specifically, the Panel will: 
 
a) Examine today’s global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to 
international peace and security.  Whilst there may continue to exist a diversity of 
perception on the relative importance of the various threats facing particular 
Member States on an individual basis, it is important to find an appropriate balance 
at a global level.  It is also important to understand the connections between 
different threats.  
 
b)  Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing 
these challenges.  
 
c)  Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, 
including but not limited to a review of the principal organs of the United Nations.  
 
The Panel’s work is confined to the field of peace and security, broadly interpreted.  
That is, it should extend its analysis and recommendations to other issues and 
institutions, including economic and social, to the extent that they have a direct 
bearing on future threats to peace and security 
 
 
Source: UN News November 2003, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sga857.doc.htm, 17/11/2004 
 
  
Appendix 4 
 
Part of page 81 of Report of High-Level Panel 
 
 
 
252. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, 
and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major 
regional areas as follows: 
 
Regional area No. of States 
Permanent 
seats 
(continuing) 
Proposed new 
permanent 
seats 
Proposed 
two-year seats 
(non-
renewable) 
Total 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia and 
Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 1 2 6 
Americas 35 1 1 4 6 
Totals 
Model A 191 5 6 13 24 
 
 
253. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category 
of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent 
(and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows: 
 
Regional area No. of States 
Permanent 
seats 
(continuing) 
Proposed 
four-year 
renewable 
seats 
Proposed 
two-year seats 
(non-
renewable) 
Total 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia and 
Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 2 1 6 
Americas 35 1 2 3 6 
Totals 
Model B 191 5 8 11 24 
 
 
 
Source: Report 2004:81, http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf, 03/12/2004 
 
 
